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Summary  findings
Fiscal policy is central to a counltry's  economic  arld social  either over time or across countries, and he discusses
objectives, from macroeconomic stability to sustainable  practical issues arising from this adaptation.  Dinh1
growth and poverty reductioCn.  BLut  evalUations  of a  proposes two indicators to measure fiscal adjustment
country's fiscal performance, over time or relative to  efforts:
other countries, are often conducted indepenident of  *  Fiscal solvency adjustment, which measures how far
other development objectives. disregarding the links  additional fiscal efforts must be taken to restore solvency
between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies.  to the fiscal sector.
A budget deficit of 4 percent of GDI', for example,  Fiscal sustainability adjustmeint,  which measures
may be acceptable in one country bLut  not in another,  how far additional fiscal efforts inust be taken to
because of different initial conditions and policy  maintain the ratios of internal and external debt to
priorities. In the same country, a level of fiscal deficit  OUtpUt.
may be acceptable one year bhtt  not the next, depending  l)inh applies the proposed framework to evaluate
on developments and clhanges  in policy objectives.  recent fiscal performance in three countries - Argentina,
Dinh argues for assessing fiscal performaiice ( I) as part  India, and Zambia - each with a different income level
of the entire framework of economic policy, (2) against a  and located oin a different continent. The countries were
policy objective, (3) by taking into account both short-  selected on the basis of recent World Bank economic
and long-term considerations, and (4) witlh  an eye to the  work using the proposed approach or an equivalent.
quality of adjustment (whether there are income  Dinh finds the proposed approach useful for identifying
inequalities or other social issues, for example) as well as  key fiscal issues, for assessing the adequacy and pace of
its magnitude.  fiscal adjustment consistent with the overall economic
The approach lie proposes for assessitig  couLntrv  fiscal  and social objectives, and for highlighting the tradeoffs
performance requires a minimum1  of data and takes into  between policy initiatives.
account flow and stock variables on internal and external  Sound fiscal policy is crucial for macroeconomic
debt. The approach addresses the shortcomin¢gs  of  stability. When fiscal issues are under control, it is easier
conventional analysis by incorporatilig the debt dynamlics  to coordinate other policies. When fiscal issues are part
and other macroeconomic targets of growth, iiiflation,  of the problem, the tradeoffs between policy outcomes
and external and internal debt. While its theoretical  become pronouniced, and economic management,
foundation is well known in the literature, this approach  including the management of capital flows, becomes
has not  been  adapted  for assessing  fiscal performlancce  much  more  difficult.
This paper is a product of Macroeconomics 1, Africa Technical Families. Copies of the paper are available free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please  contact Manorama Rani, roomJ 11-278, telephone 202-
473-2057, fax 202-473-81 79, Internet addrcss mrani(o worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on the Web at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/research/workpapers.nsf/policyresearch?openform.  The author  may be
contacted at hdinh(a  ;worldbank.org. October  1999. (32 pages)
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developmentt  issIues. An  objective <f  the  series  is to  gct  the  findings  out  quickly,  ev  len  if the presentations  are less tbani fully  polished.  The
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FISCAL SOLVENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY IN ECONOMIC  MANAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
1.  Fiscal policy plays a central role in helping a country achieve its economic and social
objectives, from macroeconomic stability to sustainable growth and poverty reduction.
However, the evaluation of a country's fiscal performance, either over time or in relation to
other countries, is often conducted independently of other development objectives and/or of
the linkages among fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies.  In a financially integrated
world, this approach is misleading because it sheds little light on a prudent level of fiscal
deficit and consequently on the appropriate pace of fiscal adjustment. A budget deficit of 4
percent of GDP, for example, may be acceptable in one country but not in another because of
different initial conditions and policy priorities. In the same country, a particular fiscal
deficit level may be adequate in one year but not the next depending on internal and external
developments and on changes in policy objectives. For international financial institutions,
this absence of a yardstick to measure fiscal performance implies that the design of
adjustment programs lacks common standards across countries and that lessons from the past
cannot be effectively disseminated.
2.  This paper argues that a simple approach based on solvency and sustainability could
help assess fiscal performance over time and across countries in a consistent macroeconomic
framework. This approach takes into account a number of factors. First,  given the
increasing interdependence among fiscal, monetary, and exchange-rate policies in a
financially integrated world, fiscal performance cannot be analyzed in isolation; it must be
assessed as an integral part of the policy framework. Second, fiscal performance should be
measured against a policy objective.  The adjustment effort to reach this objective depends on
initial conditions, as well as  the expected policy measures. Third, fiscal assessment should
take into account both short-term and long-term considerations. In practice, this means
policy performance must be analyzed from both  long-run solvency and short-run
sustainability perspectives, and given the close linkages with other policies, from both
external and internal balance viewpoints. Fourth, fiscal policy is intimately linked to other
political economy issues (income inequalities, social issues, and so on) so that the quality of
fiscal adjustment is at least as important as its magnitude.
3.  Section II reviews the role of fiscal policy in country economic management. Section
III presents a model of fiscal solvency and sustainability and proposes two indicators to
assess fiscal performance either over time or across countries: (i) fiscal solvency adjustment
which measures how far additional fiscal effort needs to be undertaken to restore solvency to
the public sector; and (ii) fiscal sustainability adjustment which measures how far additional
fiscal effort is required without incurring new internal or external debt relative to output.
This approach brings out the critical role of fiscal policy as an anchor for macro stability and
also highlights the increasingly indistinct line between traditional internal and external-4-
balances.  Section IV discusses the need to supplement the proposed framework with in-
depth knowledge of country-specific fiscal issues. Section V applies the proposed
framework to evaluate fiscal performance in three countries: Zambia, India and Argentina.
These countries have different income levels, are located in three different continents, and are
selected on the basis of recent World Bank economic work using the proposed approach or
equivalent. Section VI concludes and proposes directions for further research.
II.  FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
4.  Fiscal policy is critical in economic management for several reasons. In many
developing countries, only the public-sector can borrow from abroad and repay the external
debt. Thus, what happens to the public-sector has a direct bearing on the country's external
debt and debt service.  Of the total long term debt stock of developing countries in 1997,
public-sector debt accounted for 86 percent'.  Even if a country's external debt is contracted
by the private-sector, experience has shown that governments often take over that obligation
when the public-sector's credit rating is adversely affected by private-sector debt problems.
5.  The importance of linkages between fiscal policy and other economic policies cannot
be overstated. A country's deficit financing determines its domestic interest rates and
inflation, which in turn drive exchange rate expectations and the private-sector's capacity to
earn foreign exchange, and therefore repay debt. Fiscal policy, of course, can also affect
private-sector growth directly by crowding out private investment. Another channel through
which fiscal policy can influence economic activities is the micro effects that tax and
spending decisions have on the behavior of households and firms.  Thus a country's ability
and willingness to repay its external debt obligations is closely linked to the ability of the
public-sector to tax its residents and to use the revenue to buy foreign exchange for debt
service payments.
6.  Fiscal policy is not the only way that a government can influence economic activities.
Other instruments include monetary, exchange-rate, financial, and income policies.  The
traditional separation of fiscal from other macro policies, particularly monetary policy, while
useful as an analytical device, is no longer appropriate in the real world of developing
countries for a number of reasons. If there is no independent central bank, monetary policy
frequently accommodates fiscal policy.  The dominant role and intervention of many
governments in the financial sector also drives financial policy to depend on fiscal policy.
And the limited domestic market for bonds and government debt instruments, together with
limited access to international capital markets, often leave governments with few choices
except inflation financing. Furthermore, in many transition economies, fiscal and monetary
policies are indistinguishable.
7.  New developments in international finance in the 1  990s tend to reinforce linkages
between fiscal and other macroeconomic policies.  First, the world has become more
I See Global  Economic  Prospects,  1999,  p. 182.-5-
integrated in trade and finance and has made it virtually impossible to insulate domestic
policies (such as fiscal policy) from other policies (exchange-rate or interest-rate policies, for
instance), either within or across countries.  Second, there has been a surge in capital flows to
developing countries in recent years.  Some represent the return of flight capital of the
1980's but most inflows are direct and portfolio investment. These flows have important
implications for fiscal policy as discussed later in this paper.  Third, many developing
countries are undergoing structural adjustment, including financial-sector reform and
deregulation of capital markets. These measures will most likely lead to closer integration of
fiscal policy with other macro policies.
8.  Traditional economic theory emphasizes the distinction between domestic debt and
external debt. Domestic debt is thought to be not as significant as external debt since it
involves borrowing and lending decisions within a country, and because the government's
ability to finance this debt by printing money is thought to be unlimited. External debt, on
the other hand, has always been treated more seriously because transactions across national
borders involve transfers of wealth to foreigners, and because debt-service payments are
limited by foreign-exchange earnings. These views have proved to be wrong - misguided
fiscal policies in developing countries in the 1970's led to the debt crisis of 1982.
Hyperinflation in Latin America in the 1  980s also showed that there is a limit to deficit
financing through money creation. It is also interesting to note that while many countries
chose to default their external debt in the 1  980s, they continued to honor their domestic debt
obligations. Moreover, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and subsequently the East Asian crisis
demonstrated that with an open capital account, the stock of domestic debt could become
closely integrated with external debt. Another phenomenon which strengthens the linkages
between fiscal policy and monetary and exchange-rate policies is currency substitution or
dollarization, which has become popular in many developing countries. These linkages make
it impossible to examine fiscal policy independently from other macroeconomic policies.
9.  Traditional fiscal theory tends to stress the neutrality of fiscal policy- that is,  the best
fiscal policy is one that minimizes distortions in the economy. Both tax and expenditure
policies are judged on the basis of two micro criteria: efficiency and equity.  The impact of
fiscal policy on aggregate demand has received attention only in the past few decades.  More
recently there have been attempts to link fiscal policy to growth, through the new endogenous
models of growth 2. The consensus appears to be that while a prudent fiscal policy is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rapid economic growth, an imprudent fiscal policy
hampers growth, jeopardizes macro stability, and carries high costs to the economy.
10.  Cross-country analysis of fiscal performance is often difficult to carry out for several
reasons. First, there is a lack of a common definition of fiscal deficit.  Second, unlike
variables related to the balance-of-payments, budget data are usually sparse and available
2 See William Easterly and Sergio Rebelo. Fiscal  Policy  and Economic  Growth:  An Empirical  Investigation.
NBER Working Paper 4499, October 1993.-6-
only after a time lag3. There are only a handful of countries where fiscal data are adequate
for any serious research.  Third, given the different time and country-specific coverage of
data and policy, fiscal performance cannot be compared across countries in a rigorous
fashion. Fourth, because of the linkages with other policies, it is difficult to examine fiscal
policy separate from other policy variables.
11.  The lack of a common definition of budget deficit, in particular, makes it difficult to
compare fiscal performance across countries. Ideally, the appropriate deficit to measure is
the consolidated public-sector deficit which takes into account the whole public-sector -the
equivalent of the current-account deficit on the external side of the economy.  It would take
into account not only central government, local governments, and municipal accounts, but
non-financial public-enterprises, public-sector banks, the social security system, and the
central bank.  It would then be easy to review the impact such deficit would have on the
"pure" private-sector of the economy. In practice, this may never happen for a number of
reasons 4, not the least of which is that the definition (and calculation) of the deficit is likely
to be dictated by data availability and the interest of the researcher. This choice also depends
on the role of the public-sector in the economy. Therefore, a definition of budget deficit
would need to be specified beforehand. The most comprehensive definition is that given by
the IMF's  Governnent Financial Statistics. Information from other official and unofficial
sources are often more recent, but are not standardized nor systematic with regard to
coverage and methodology.
12.  Even more important than the coverage of fiscal deficit is the appropriate level of this
deficit and the speed of fiscal adjustment. As mentioned earlier, a budget deficit of, say, 4
percent of GDP may be adequate for one country but not for another because fiscal policy is
an integral part of the policy framevork.  It may be adequate for an economy with single
digit-inflation but may be woefully inadequate for a country with 70 percent inflation.
Similarly, a target reduction in the budget deficit, (say, 2 percentage points of GDP), may not
be nearly enough for an economy where the exchange rate is being used as a nominal anchor
but may be sufficient for one in which money supply serves as the anchor.
13.  Because of the strong linkages between fiscal, monetary, and other macro-economic
policies, the appropriateness of a particular fiscal deficit target depends on other targets for
growth, inflation, and extemal and internal debt. Unless these linkages are brought out
explicitly,  conventional fiscal measures (such as the deficit to GDP or government debt
service to revenues) shed little light on the appropriate level of fiscal deficit and consequently
3 It is not unusual to find data three years or older in many official or unofficial documents, for example,  the
IMF publication on budgets, the Government Financial Statistics.
4 Even if a consolidated fiscal account were available, the line drawn between public and private enterprises
would always be arbitrary. Even within a closed economy, the conventional measure of fiscal deficit (the
difference between total revenues and expenditures) has limitations in assessing the impact of fiscal policy on
aggregate demand.  For developing countries, these problems are compounded by inflation, debt arrears, and
quasi-fiscal activities, as well as the temporary nature of some fiscal measures (such as the sale of public
assets).  Indeed, a recent IMF study has concluded that there is no such thing as the fiscal deficit. See M. Blejer
and A. Cheasty, Eds. How to Measure  the F iscal Deficit.  IMF, 1993.-7-
on the appropriate speed of fiscal adjustment. For international financial institutions, this
also implies that the design of adjustment programs lacks rigor and standards across countries
and that lessons from the past cannot be effectively disseminated. The model presented in
the next section addresses some of  these serious issues.
III.  A MODEL OF FISCAL  SOLVENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY
Fiscal Solvency
14.  The distinction between solvency and liquidity problems of the public-sector is
derived from the theory of finance. A firm is insolvent if its net worth (assets minus
liabilities) is negative, and is illiquid if it cannot meet its obligations. A company can be
solvent (have a positive net worth) yet experience cash flow (liquidity) problems. On the
other hand, it could have a positive cash flow and still be insolvent. The distinction is
important in an accounting sense, because solvency relates to the asset side of the balance
sheet (net worth), while liquidity relates to liabilities. In practice, they are closely related.
By definition, net worth is a balancing item and includes liabilities. Moreover, the terms
solvency and illiquidity are almost interchangeable when describing an institution or country
in crisis. The real distinction is the implication that solvency is irretrievable and must lead to
liquidation, whereas illiquidity may be a temporary state.
15.  For the public-sector, the concept of solvency is derived from the definition that, just
like any other entities in the economy, it has to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint:
fs,e-rdt  = Bo.  (1)
0
where S, is the primary balance (budget balance, excluding interest payments) in period t, r
is the discount rate, and Bo is the initial level of public debt. Ideally, this public debt should
be net -that is, include other public-sector assets and liabilities 5. It can be shown that
equation (1) is true if, and only if,  the transversality condition is satisfied 6:
LimB, expr'  = 0  (2)
16.  The above equation states that the present discounted value of a country's public-
sector debt falls to zero as time progresses. This does not mean that debt should go to zero or
even stay constant. Debt can grow at a positive rate in the long run.  Of course, a permanent
fiscal deficit is inconsistent with the above condition. A deficit at any point in time (or over a
period of time) has to be offset by a surplus at another point in time.
5 For the above  integral  to be bounded,  r has to be positive. If r is negative,  the debt  would  explode  -that is, it
would be beneficial to borrow forever. As shown by Diamond (1965), in these economies, current debt
increase has no impact on future surpluses.
6 See, for example, Cohen (1991) for the external debt for an infinitely lived economy with finite wealth.-8-
17.  Define s* as the proportion of output that holds equation (1) above, we have
Is  *(g-r)tdt  BO(3
o  0
Solving for s* yields
s*  Bo (r-  g)  (4)
YO
Where Y is output (GDP), g is output (GDP) growth rate, and B]3  is the initial government
debt. Note that one could define s* as a proportion of government revenue rather than of
output.
18.  As the above equations show, s* is the proportion of output that would keep the
public-sector solvent. The higher s* is, the greater is the proportion of output that must be
devoted to debt service to keep the public-sector solvent. Thus, for a  B. of  0.65, a
differential in interest rate and GDP growth of 0.05, the public sector solvency index, s*, is
0.03 - that is, about 3 percent of GDP would have to be devoted to debt servicing for the
government to be solvent.
19.  Most countries are net debtors, i.e.,  Bo > 0, and equation (4) states that for these
countries, a primary budget surplus is required to attain fiscal solvency if the real rate of
interest exceeds output growth, i.e. , (r-g)>0. The public sector has to make debt service
payment at least equal to s*, or equivalently, it should have a primary surplus equal to s*. A
primary fiscal surplus less than that amount (or a primary fiscal deficit) in that case implies
perpetual public sector borrowing and debt accumulated indefinitely. For a country whose
rate of output growth exceeds the real rate of interest, (r-g)<0, incurring a primary deficit is
still consistent with solvency. However, a deficit higher than s* implies that the country is
moving away from a fiscal solvency position.  As will be shown below, many developing
countries are facing either a GDP growth rate lower than the real rate of interest, or a primary
deficit much larger than one consistent with solvency defined in (4) above.
20.  Equation (4) above provides a method to assess a country's fiscal position over time
and across countries. The difference between s* and the actual primary deficit measures how
far additional fiscal efforts need to be undertaken to restore solvency to the public sector and
is referred to as  fiscal  solvency adjustment in this paper. A positive number indicates that the
country in question needs to make fiscal adjustments to restore solvency. A negative number
indicates that no adjustment is required. The evolution of this indicator over time shows
7 The above equation was constructed on continuous terms.  In discrete terrns, it could be shown that (r-y)
becomes  r-g
l+g-9-
whether a country is moving closer or farther from a fiscal solvency position 8. Note that for
any given actual primary surplus, the higher output growth, the smaller is the required fiscal
adjustment.
21.  In equation (4), the fiscal solvency adjustment depends on a static component (the
traditional value of initial debt to output ratio) and on a dynamic component (the expected
real interest rate and real output growth). It is this dynamic component that the solvency
concept introduces to conventional measures of the public-sector debt overhang. It could be
argued that it makes little sense to use conventional ratios, such as debt-to-GDP, to measure
the domestic debt overhang because a debt-to-GDP ratio of, say, 65 percent may be low for a
country whose growth prospects are considerable but high for a country where growth is
declining. Similarly, a given amount of fiscal adjustment may be adequate in a country
where growth can be readily restored (for example, where structural reforms have already
been undertaken) but inadequate in one where economic growth is low due to policy
distortions 9.
22.  No matter what the initial public debt stock is, if g > r, and if the public-sector's
primary surplus is equal to interest payments, (that is, net debt is rolled over), the country's
debt remains constant and its discounted value approaches zero as time progresses' 0. The
public-sector will remain solvent as long as the real interest rate is less than the real output
growth. This is because the mechanics of compound interest rates is such that as long as the
real rate of interest is positive, the discounted value of debt will vanish as time approaches
infinity. However, a situation where the long run growth rate of output is permanently higher
than the real rate of interest is not possible because it implies inefficient economies.
23.  While the concept of solvency is important for new creditors, it is not relevant for
existing creditors. In the late 1  970s, for instance, New York city was broke -that is, both
illiquid and insolvent - but this did not prevent creditors from getting together to bail out the
city.  The issues facing existing creditors are different from those facing new creditors.
Existing creditors are looking at alternative actions to recover assets, while new creditors are
faced with choosing the best rate of return for their money among a range of investments.
Thus knowing a country is insolvent may help new creditors but does little for existing
creditors. What matters for existing creditors is not whether the public-sector is insolvent,
but whether the current fiscal stance would move the country away from or closer to
solvency. The direction of policy change is an important factor in determining whether
creditors continue to rollover old debt and/or acquire new debt, or whether an exit strategy is
more appropriate'I.
8 Note that this is not an equilibrium fiscal position in the traditional sense of the word.
9 This statement assumes that the fiscal adjustment undertaken is growth neutral.
10  Assuming the real interest rate is positive
I I In fact, the proposed approach, when combined with contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal accounts, could
explain many currency crises such as those of the East Asian countries in the post-1997 period.-10-
Fiscal Sustainability
24.  The above concept of fiscal solvency requires knowledge of several long run
variables: real interest rate and real growth rate, both are not directly observable and have to
be approximated. As discussed below, one could use the actual real rate of interest as a
proxy for the long run real interest rate and real GDP growth in the past as a proxy for long-
run output growth. Another proxy for the real discount rate is the opportunity cost of capital
or marginal product of capital.
25.  Alternatively, one could observe a one-period budget constraint to infer about
solvency condition in the future.  We define fiscal sustainability the one-period condition
such that solvency can be assured in the future. Fiscal sustainability can be derived from the
instantaneous view of the budget constraint:
D +  iB +  Ei* (1  - )B*  =  B +  EB*(1  -)  +M  (5)
where D is the primary fiscal deficit, i is the nominal interest rate paid on domestic debt, B is
the public-sector's domestic debt, and E is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per
unit of foreign exchange). A star next to a variable indicates the external sector and a dot
above a variable indicates its rate o:f  change. Thus, B* is the public-sector's foreign debt, B
is the change in domestic debt, i* is the nominal interest rate paid on foreign debt. M is the
monetary base, and ,t is the grant or "soft money" component of the budget.  For many low-
income countries, grants are an important component of the budget.




Equation  (5) can be expressed as:
A.A  A  I
d + ib + i * (1  - u)b*  =+  bp+ (1 - u)(b * -b  * (e-  p*)  + m(p+  g) or
d + ib - b p+ (i * - p* + e)(1 - p)b* = b + (1 - u)b * +m(p+  g)
where g is the growth rate of output. Rewrite:
d + rb+(I - p)b*(r * +)  = b+(I-,ub+m(p+g)where  r=  i-  p
Divide the above by  y
dI/ y +rb / y +(b */y)(Il-,u)(r  * +e)  b  bl  y+ (I - )b* ly +(m / y)(p+  g)  (6)
Define  B  b*
y  x
Hence  b/y=  /1+  ,Bg; and b * /x  =  ,B*  + ,B* xor, in terms of y,
-b  (/J*  +  *x)  (7)
y  y
Hence
d  rb  (I-1L)b*(r*+e)  b*  b*  m
- +  - +  =  - +  (O-F)-+  - (P  +  g)  (8)
y  y  y  y  y  y
or,
d 
-+r  +  (1-p)(x/y),B*(r*+e)=  /J+/Jg  +(1-,p),6*+,6i*  x)  +  - (p  +  g)
y  y
Also from the quantity theory of money:
Mv=Py  (9)
In the short term, assuming a fixed velocity of money demand v, mly=  1/v
Hence
d  *x  A  ^  ^*
d=  , +O1-xy  p"*+r(g-r)+  (1-pt)(x/y),8*(x  -r*-e)  +  1/v  (p  +  g)
y  y
(10)
Equation 10 shows a snapshot of the government budget constraint. This constraint depends
on a number of factors, including the existing stock of domestic and foreign debt ,B  and  i *;
real interest and growth rates, r and g; the proportion of exports in national output-;  export
y
growth rate x; real international interest rate r*; real exchange rate change e; the inverse of
the velocity  of money  demand-,  and inflation rate  p.
y
26.  We now define the condition for public sector sustainability as one with  ,B  = 0,
or
d  ^  A
- ,B(g-r)+  (1-p)(x/y),8*(x  -r*-e)  +  1/v  (p  +  g)  (11)
y
The condition states that there are three possible sources of financing the primary fiscal
deficit in a sustainable way : domestic borrowing if output growth is greater than the interest
rate on domestic debt; by external borrowing when export growth is higher than international
interest rates, plus currency depreciation; and by money financing when it is consistent with-12-
seignorage. Because it relates to a one-period budget constraint, it also shows the liquidity
constraint of the public sector.
d
27.  Define s** =  --  as the prirnary surplus (expressed as a percentage of output) needed
y
to achieve debt sustainability for the public sector,
s**=  3(r-g)+  (1l-t)(x/y),6*(r*+  e  -x  )  - 1/v  (p  +  g)  (12)
Equation 12 constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for debt sustainability
of the public-sector.
28.  To assess progress of fiscal policy, the above formulation of fiscal sustainability
condition needs to be compared to the actual fiscal deficit. We define fiscal sustainability
adjustment the difference between the sustainable primary balance defined in equation 12
above and the actual primary balance. A positive number indicates the need for fiscal
adjustment and a negative number indicates no adjustment is required as far as fiscal
sustainability is concerned. The evolution of this number over time is important from a
policy standpoint because its indicates whether the existing fiscal stance would drive the
country away or towards sustainability.
29.  The sustainability condition of  the fiscal deficit, equation 12, differs from the
solvency condition, equation 4, in several respects. First, it is a one-period-budget constraint,
unlike the intertemporal budget constraint of equation 4.  Second, data for equation 12 are
observable and  are readily available. Third, for  pt = l $*=  0,  S**  is smaller than s* by the
amount of inflation tax (including seignorage) which one can extract from the public in any
period but presumably not in the long run.
30.  The two indicators proposed above, s* and s**, can address the shortcomings of the
conventional fiscal indicators in a number of ways. They take into account the existing
stocks of internal and external debt, as well as other macroeconomic variables such as export
growth, real interest rates, real exchange rates.  Fiscal performance is assessed against long
run solvency perspective, as well as short run liquidity. The adequacy of fiscal efforts
therefore can be evaluated both within a country and across countries over time.  There is less
dependence on the coverage of fiscal data than on movements away from or towards a policy
objective. However, given the linkages between fiscal policy and other macroeconomic
policies, these indicators need to be supplemented by a qualitative analysis of fiscal issues.
31.  The short-term sustainability condition in equation (12) applies to the fiscal deficit at
any point in time.  Summing up equation (12) for all time periods will lead to the solvency
condition (4), although the converse is not true.  Equation (12) differs from equation (4) in
several aspects. First, (12) is a snapshot of the fiscal situation at a particular time, whereas-13-
equation (4) covers all time periods.  Second, because of its short-term nature, equation (12)
deals with actual economic conditions at a particular time.
32.  The same concept of public sector solvency and sustainability discussed in this paper
can be extended to the entire country.  In another paper, we derive two indicators to measure
the required adjustment for external debt solvency (external solvency adjustment) and
required adjustment for external sustainability (external sustainability adjustment) of a
country. Box 1 below shows the four indicators and their relationships to internal and
external balance. Annex Table A2 shows an example for India.
Box I.- Solvency  and Sustainability  Indicators for Internal  and External  Balance
External  Balance  Internal  Balance
External  Solvency  Adjustment  Fiscal  Solvency  Adjustment
Ssinabili  External  Sustainability  Fiscal  Sustainability  Adjustment
IV.  QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF FISCAL SOLVENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY
ANALYSIS
33.  The fiscal solvency and sustainability conditions by no means imply a plausible or
realistic outcome.  The solvency condition shows a fiscal position that at the very least, does
not lead to an explosive debt while the sustainability shows a fiscal position which would be
consistent with other policy targets, such as inflation, export growth and GDP growth. The
path from the existing fiscal position to a solvent or sustainable one depends on the political
powers of the current government, the strength of the opposition groups, and ultimately the
willingness of citizens to undertake adjustments today for a better future.  Whether a
particular path of fiscal adjustment should be taken therefore depends on the judgments of
policy makers. The proposed analysis serves to bring all the relevant policy variables into a
coherent framework and helps focus attention on the key policy constraints to a solvent and
sustainable fiscal position.
34.  Given the complexities involved, it is important that the quantitative analysis be
supplemented  by in-depth, country-specific qualitative analyses of fiscal issues. Among the
important qualitative fiscal issues are:
*  The country's track record in reducing the budget deficit.-14-
*  The size and growth of the consolidated budget deficit to GDP and the size of public-
sector borrowing requirement to GDP.
*  The importance of  non-central government accounts such as extra-budgetary accounts,
social security system, central bank, public-enterprises, public-sector banks, and semi-
public organizations
*  Whether the root cause of budget imbalance comes from the revenue side, or the
expenditure side, or both.
*  The structure of revenues: direct vs. indirect taxes, other potential sources of revenues
such as implicit or explicit subsidies.
*  The buoyancy of the tax system and the degree of rent capturing which could be subject
to exogenous shocks.
*  The transitional nature of revenues: sources of revenues (such as sale of public assets)
that may not be permanent.
*  The structure of expenditures: recurrent vs. capital expenditures. Within each category,
potential sources of cuts and their impact on the efficiency and equity of public service
delivery: the wage bill, subsidies, operations and maintenance, and capital expenditures.
*  The impact of domestic borrowing on private investment, on the financial sector and the
banking system (for example, banks are required to hold a percentage of deposits in
Government bonds). Impact of external borrowing on debt servicing problems. Impact
of inflation on growth, investment and income distribution.
*  Other methods of financing the budget deficit: seignorage, inflation tax, and sale of
government assets.
*  The extent to which the budget has been affected by the stock of domestic debt and by
inflation.
*  The extent to which the public-sector has generated foreign exchange to service its debt
payments. In this context, the nature of the current exchange rate regime, including the
restrictions on current-account and capital-account transactions.
*  The extent to which the Goverinment  has received grants and soft money from foreign
governments to finance projects whose expenditures are included above the line.-15-
V. FISCAL AND QUASI-FISCAL DEFICITS AND COORDINATION OF
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
35.  The strong linkages between fiscal policy and monetary and exchange rate policies
have also reflected in the emergence of quasi-fiscal deficits in the last two decades, beginning
first in Latin America and later in other countries including East Asian countries. A quasi-
fiscal deficit is a deficit caused by the central bank's operations which are not directly related
to the financing of the public-sector deficit. These operations are not captured in the normal
budgetary operations and are usually hidden from public-sector accounts. Operations that
give rise to quasi-fiscal activities typically involve the central bank's guarantees of exchange
rates and interest rates on loans to commercial banks or to other agents such as public
enterprises, provincial banks etc.  Thus, when the exchange rate is subsequently devalued or
interest rates are raised, the central bank finds itself paying for the mismatch between assets
and liabilities.
36.  In many Latin American countries, quasi-fiscal deficits are also used to indirectly
finance the budget deficits.  The central bank could raise reserve requirement thereby
increase the demand for money and provide a temporary, non-inflationary means to finance
the budget deficit . In effect, this amounts to a tax on financial intermediation. At other
times, the central bank would need to pay interest for its past losses. In fact, it is often
difficult to estimate quasi-fiscal deficits with accuracy because any point in time, a central
bank's liabilities are accumulated over time with different (subsidized) interest rates and
exchange rates. In some countries, quasi-fiscal deficits also involve public-enterprise
activities, mainly because of the lack of independence between the central bank and the
ministry of finance, which usually finances losses incurred by these enterprises.
37.  While the macro-economic effects are similar, there are two features that distinguish
quasi-fiscal deficits from regular fiscal deficits. First, unlike the ministry of finance, a central
bank does not have any authority to tax real economic activities to finance its operations.
Financing a quasi-fiscal deficit therefore entails printing money.  Second, the true magnitude
of quasi-fiscal deficits is usually hidden because only a small part of the contingent liabilities
shows up in the budget. Analysis of solvency and sustainability therefore should always take
into account the stock of contingent liabilities.
38.  In the above model, the existence of a quasi-fiscal deficit reduces the level of fiscal
sustainability, everything being equal. Let a be the quasi-fiscal deficit, defined as a
proportion of the change in the monetary base; a  includes the central bank's interest
payments on its existing debt stock. It can be seen that the sustainable budget deficit is now
reduced by (a /v) (p + g).
39.  The existence of these quasi-fiscal deficits implies that to successfully address any
issue concerning interest rates, exchange rates, the budget, public enterprises, and the
financial sector, the authorities need to address all these issues simultaneously. Policies
affecting the real sector therefore need to be closely coordinated with the financial sector. In-16-
the absence of a public-enterprise reforn,  for example, raising interest rates could help
improve the allocation and mobilization of financial resources in the economy but could also
adversely affect the profitability of public enterprises which, given the soft budget constraint
and/or absence of an independent central bank, could lead to an increase in the budget deficit
or quasi-fiscal deficit. In the end, therefore, how high interest rates should be raised depends
on how much the budget could absorb the losses from the real side.  The same hold true in
the case of a banking crisis.
40.  Fiscal issues have to be tackled simultaneously with  reforns  of the financial sector
and of the public-enterprise sector. It is not an accident that in countries where budget
deficits are high, domestic interest rates are kept low and often negative in real terms.
Macroeconomic reforms can only be effective when sustained by these micro and structural
measures.  Since the impact and speed of response of each type of reform on the economy is
different from one another, policy coordination is a key element for the success of
stabilization and sustained growth.
41.  The interrelationship between fiscal and other macroeconomic policies can be seen
clearly in high-inflation economies.  The experience of these countries shows that while
fiscal policy appears to be a necessary condition, it alone is not a sufficient condition for
stabilization, In these economies, authorities have often resorted to orthodox stabilization
programs to bring down inflation, either through an exchange rate based regime, or a money
supply based regime.  As discussed in Kiguel and Leviathan1 2 , money-based stabilization
programs (as in Argentina in 1976-78 and Chile in 1974-75) often caused high costs to the
economy in the form of lower output and higher unemployment. Moreover, these programs,
which entail stringent fiscal policy, brought inflation down from hyperinflationary levels
only after a long time, and even then, inflation would be sticky downwards after reaching
double-digit figures and would remain stubbornly high.  On the other hand, countries that
adopted the exchange rate based regime, with or without a stringent fiscal policy, also ended
up with large real exchange rate appreciation, big current-account deficits, and eventually a
balance-of-payment  crisis13.
12 See, for example, Kiguel and Liviathan, Exchange Based Stabilization Programs,WB Staff Paper 1318.
13 Kiguel and Leviathan pointed out  the experience of Argentina in 1978-80 when inflation fell from 175
percent in 1978 to 100 percent in 1980, at a cost of real exchange rate appreciation of 45 percent.  The current-
account balance swung from surplus to deficit (3 percent of GDP in 1980) which led to a balance-of-payments
crisis. Part of the reason was the laxed fiscal stance: the fiscal deficit reached 8 percent of GDP in 1980, while
monetary policy was tight leading to high domestic interest rates.  Chile's experience in 1978,  on the other
hand,  showed that even with a strong fiscal position, an exchange rate based program could still lead to a
balance-of-payments crisis. When the exchange rate appreciated by 20-30 percent and the current-account
deficit reached 14 percent of GDP in 1981, flight capital began leaving the country and a crisis broke out.
During this period, however, the public-sector maintained a surplus in the primary, operational, and overall
balance of  GDP.-17-
VI.  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
42.  In this section, we apply the above model to evaluate fiscal performance in three
countries: Zambia, India and Argentina. These countries have different income levels and are
located in three different continents. We compare the derived fiscal indicators with
conventional fiscal indicators and show that the proposed indicators are both richer in a
normative and positive sense to conventional indicators. The three countries are selected on
the basis of  formal fiscal analyses which were based on the above model of solvency and
sustainability or equivalent and whose results have been presented in World Bank economic
reportsl4. These countries also cover a range of different stages of economic development, as
well as fiscal problems commonly seen  in developing countries. In all cases the empirical
results have been discussed with Government officials so that no policy surprises are
expected. Before reviewing the empirical results, issues concerning data and interpretation
are summarized below.
Data Problems and Issues
43.  Problems in estimating public sector activities. Ultimately, any model is as good
as the data it applies to and this model is no exception. As discussed earlier, a correct
measurement of fiscal activities is a necessary condition for good fiscal analysis. A country's
fiscal problems can be easily hidden if a comprehensive  measure of fiscal activities is not
available. But comprehensive information on accounts of the non-financial public sector -
other than that of the central government-such  as local government, extra-budgetary funds,
state-owned enterprises, and government guarantees are often hard to get and if available, are
often not up-to-date.  The losses of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often created a huge
implicit liability to the government.  In order to finance its operating losses, SOEs usually
rely on issuing short-term debt with credit on inventory and future sales of output.
Ultimately, these losses will be borne by the public sector, either because the debt will be
taken over by the Government or because public assets will be depleted at the time of
privatization.
44.  Domestic Debt.  Of the variables that are required for the above framework, the
hardest to find is stock of domestic debt. This perhaps reflects economists' tendency to focus
more on flows than stocks. The definition of domestic debt has to be consistent with the
fiscal deficit in use.  For example, if the available fiscal accounts do not include social
security operations, the domestic debt should net out transactions between the central
government accounts and the social security system. For many countries, available data do
not include any information on domestic debt. Because the ability to issue domestic debt
instruments depends more on the development stage of the financial sector than on budget
needs, it is not surprising that for many low income countries, the stock of domestic debt is
not significant compared to the external debt of the public-sector. For those countries with a
14 See Zambia: Fiscal Management Report, World Bank Report 18552-ZA, November 1998;  India Country Economic Memorandum,
Report Number 15882-IN, August 8, 1996, Chapter 3;  Argentina:  The Fiscal Dimension of the Convertibility Plan, Report No. 16996-AR,
January 1998.-18-
sophisticated financial market, however, the stock of domestic debt appears large and may
exceed external debt. Annex Table Al provides data on domestic debt of some developing
countries.
45.  Discount Rates and Solvency Adjustment. In equations (4), Bo  is the public-sector
debt, and includes both domestic and external debt, the latter denoting public and publicly-
guaranteed debt. The discount rate applied to this debt is a weighted sum of the discount rates
used for each component, the weights being their respective shares. In a neoclassical
framework, these rates are equal to the long-run costs of capital at home and abroad,
respectively, and can be closely approximated by the real interest rates that would prevail in
markets free of distortions. In industrial economies, the long-run real interest rate is
estimated between 7 and 12 percent15. For developing countries, the scarcity of capital would
imply a higher real rate of interest. A 10-15 percent real rate of interest is usually considered
appropriate.
46.  In a recent paper, Elmendor;f  and Mankiw '6calculated the marginal product of capital
(MPC) in the United States between 1960-1994. The number they obtained was 9.5%, using
the share of capital in output and the capital-output ratio.  The former was about one-third
and the latter was about three. This number represents the gross marginal product and shows
how much an extra dollar of capital adds to gross output and income. The use of a discount
rate of 10% for developing countries is therefore within a reasonable range.
47.  Similarly, in equation (12), ,B and  ,  * denote domestic and external debt, and the
interest rate applied to each refers to the actual rate that prevail in the domestic and external
capital market respectively. In many developing countries, however, a combination of
financial repression and public sector interventions often result in artificially low domestic
interest rates. For many low income countries, the availability of concessional resources and
difficult access to the international markets also mean that the actual international interest
rates are low. Hence, the use of actual interest rates will result in underestimating the
opportunity cost of capital.  For cross-country comparison of fiscal performance, moreover,
it can be argued that the choice of a common discount rate is important as international
capital flows are becoming more integrated.
48.  Effects of devaluation. The treatment of a real devaluation for sustainability analysis
is entirely short-term, that is, a real devaluation causes an increase in the debt service burden
and therefore requires further fiscal adjustment. In a sense, this reflects a trade-off between
policies for internal and external balance. Everything being equal, and under the right
conditions for demand and supply elasticities and for production capacity, a real devaluation
would improve the external current account balance but worsen the budget deficit.
15 See,  for  example, M. Boskin , "Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,
Vol. 86, April 1978.
16 See D.W. Elmendorf and N. G. Makiw, "Government Debt",  p. 20, January 1998.  Paper prepared for the
forthcoming Handbook of Macroeconomics.-19-
Fiscal Solvency and Sustainability in Zambia
49.  Since 1991, Zambia has embarked upon a far-reaching adjustment program supported
by the international community. Prices controls and subsidies (once over 10 percent of the
budget) have been abolished, exchange and interest rates have been liberalized, and serious
trade reforms have transformed the Zambian trade regime into one of the most outward-
oriented in the sub-region. The central government budget deficit (after grants and debt
rescheduling) declined from 7% of GDP in 1991 to about 2.3% in 199717.  Tax revenues
(excluding grants) reached about 19% of GDP in 1997, a respectable level for low income
countries, thanks to the establishment of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) in 1994 and
the introduction of a broad based value-added tax in 1995. An ambitious public sector
reform program has also begun.  But despite this impressive pace of liberalization, Zambia
has not been able to achieve macroeconomic stability and growth. Annual inflation was
closed to 30% in 1997-98 while the average annual GDP growth was less than 1 percent
between 1994-98.
50.  The Zambia budget has several special features. First, budget revenues are heavily
dependent on foreign grants and, until recently, on copper-related earnings.  Second,
expenditures are dominated by external debt service, the single largest expenditure item.
Third, despite the declining trend in the central government budget deficit, fiscal adjustment
has oscillated widely, with bouts of sharp fiscal adjustment followed by prolonged periods of
inaction and worsening deficits.
51.  More importantly, while the focus of fiscal adjustment has been on the budget deficit
of the central government, and rightly so at early stages of the reform program, there are
indications that the overall fiscal position of the country has shown little improvement
because the deficits of the other levels of the public sector, such as local governments, state-
owned enterprises, pension funds, special funds, and quasi-fiscal activities, have not been
brought in control. Thus, the local governments have been adversely affected by declining
grants from and rising arrears of the central government, the country's pension funds are
suffering because of the enormous level of government arrears, and most importantly, state-
owned enterprises continue to represent a huge drain on public resources. Although most
state-owned enterprises in Zambia have been privatized over the past few years, the few
remaining parastatals have continued to experience financial problems.  Operating losses of
the largest state-owned enterprise, the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mine (ZCCM),
accounted for about 5 percent of GDP in 1996 and 3.4% of GDP in 1997. These losses will
be borne eventually by the public sector.
52.  The non-financial public sector deficit-which  includes the central government
deficit plus the deficits of local governments, extra-budgetary funds (such as pension funds
and the Road Fund), and state-owned enterprises-is  estimated at about 10.4 percent  of GDP
in 1997, compared to the central government deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP (Table 1). In
17 See Zambia: Fiscal Management Report, World Bank Report 18552-ZA, November 1998.-20-
addition, the cost of quasi-fiscal activities undertaken by the central bank (including the
central bank's implicit bearing of foreign exchange risk for domestic residents who borrow
externally and the rescue of failed commercial banks and the corresponding issue of
liabilities by the central bank to a fragile financial system) is estimated at close to 3% of GDP
in 1997. These estimates are preliminary, but they reveal the presence of a considerable
quasi-fiscal deficit and indicate that substantial resources will be needed to re-capitalize and
improve the operations of non-central government institutions.
Table 1: Zambia:  Conventional Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Deficits
(in percent of GDP)
1995  1996  1997
Central Government Deficit Excluding Grants  -4.6  -2.5  -2.3
Non-financial  Public Sector Deficit  -9.3  -11.6  -10.2
Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Losses
Special Holdings of Govt Securities (prior to 1996)  -9.1  -4.6  -2.9
Payments to Failed Banksa  NA  -1.5  -0.5
Central Bank Deficit  -9.1  -6.2  -3.4
Quasi-Fiscal Deficit  -18.4  -17.8  -13.6
a. Bank failures occurring in late 1995 are included in payments made in 1996.  Failures occurring in 1997 are
included in payments made in 1997.
Source:  Zambia:  Fiscal  Management  Report.  World  Bank  Report  18552-ZA
53.  Analysis of Zambia's fiscal stance indicates that to achieve solvency and
sustainability, significant additional fiscal adjustment is required at all government levels. In
order to evaluate the required fiscal efforts, we first calculated the primary deficit that would
make the public sector solvent given the stock of public debt at the end of the previous
period, the real interest rate, and the real GDP growth rate (the real interest rate was assumed
to be constant throughout the period). This primary deficit required for solvency is then
compared to the actual (or expected) primary deficit to find the adjustment needed for public
sector solvency  18. For fiscal sustainability, we first calculated the primary deficit needed to
achieve debt sustainability (that is, to maintain the ratios of internal and external debt to GDP
at the same levels). A measure of the required adjustment is calculated by comparing this
sustainable primary deficit with the actual (or expected) primary deficit. All variables are
expressed as percentages of GDP.
18 This is equivalent to the so-called myopic one-period gap.  See Olivier Blanchard (1990).-21-
54.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 2 below.  At the end of 1997, Zambia's
fiscal balance remained far from the level required for solvency and sustainability, and fiscal
adjustment equivalent to about 2.4 percent of GDP would be needed to bring about solvency
in the central government deficit (Table 2).  However, achieving fiscal solvency for the
public sector as a whole (the quasi-fiscal deficit) would require fiscal adjustment on the order
of 16.1 % of GDP.  Because of a substantial real devaluation in 1997, fiscal adjustment to
achieve sustainability was about 25.3% of GDP, a huge requirement beyond the ability of any
government. A comparison of Table 1 and 2 also shows that while the conventional measure
of fiscal deficit (Table 1) shows a decline from 1996 to 1997, the solvency and sustainability
indicators (Table 2) show that an increase in fiscal adjustment was needed.
Table 2:  Zambia: Public Sector Solvency and Sustainability
(percentage of GDP)
1995  1996  1997
Solvency
Primary Balance  6.6  6.3  5.3
Real GDP Growth  -2.3  6.5  3.5
Domestic Debt  7.5  5.8  4.6
External Debt  207.5  188.1  178.5
Primary Balance for Solvency  22.9  6.7  7.7
Central Government Solvency Adjustment  16.3  .5  2.4
Non-financial Public Sector Solvency  23.7  12.6  12.4
Adjustment
Quasi-Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  32.8  18.8  16.1
Sustainability
Grants  5.5  5.9  4.8
Sustainable Primary Balance  15.0  11.2  30.6
Actual Central Government Primary  6.6  6.3  5.3
Balance
Central Government Sustainability  8.5  4.9  25.3
Adjustment
Non-financial Public Sector Sustainability  15.8  17.1  35.4
Adjustment
Quasi-public Sector Sustainability  24.9  23.2  39.0
Adjustment
Source:  Zambia Fiscal Management Report, World Bank Report 18552ZA
55.  We also ran additional simulations that examined the impact of slower export growth,
lower grants, and a reduced external debt burden (Table 3).  Reducing the annual rate of
export growth from 5.8 percent to 2.9 percent in 1998 would require an adjustment effort of
18.5 percent of GDP. This result reveals just how difficult the situation is in Zambia and
highlights the need for external debt relief. If both the stock of external debt and the-22-
intemational rate of interest were reduced by half, the fiscal adjustment required to restore
solvency and sustainability would be reduced to 9.2 percent and 20.7 percent of GDP.




Quasi Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  16.1
Quasi Public Sector Sustainability Adjustment  39.0
Reduced Export Growth (1.9 percent instead of 3.8 percent)
Quasi Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  18.5
-Quasi Public Sector Sustainability Adjustment  41.2
Reduced External Debt Burden (50 percent debt burden)
Quasi Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  9.2
Quasi Public Sector Sustainability Adjustment  20.7
Source:  Zambia Fiscal Management Report, World Bank Report 18552ZA
56.  The government could take a number of urgent actions to help bring the non-financial
public sector deficit and the quasi-fiscal deficit under control. These actions include the
privatization of the remaining parastatals; use of privatization proceeds to reduce the public
sector liabilities; freezing of arrears to all public entities and requiring all public agencies to
come up with plans for speedy resolution of these arrears before new funds are released to
them in the next budget year, setting out a medium-term program to reduce the non-financial
public sector deficit and the quasi-fiscal deficit to sustainable levels; designing a plan to
restore the solvency of the central bank. and other public sector financial institutions; and
improving the management of expenditures, especially the cash budget'9, to attain the
medium-term fiscal targets.
57.  The discussion of Zambia's fiscal solvency and sustainability points out several
issues. First, it is important to distinguish fiscal performance at different levels of the
government.  While it is important to tackle the central government budget deficit, as Zambia
has done until now, overall macroeconomic stability can only be achieved when the overall
fiscal position of the country (including the fiscal positions of other levels of the government)
has reached a sustainable level.  Second, in a heavily indebted, low income country such as
Zambia, debt relief, in both stock and flow terms, is an important tool for fiscal solvency and
sustainability. Third, a real devaluation can carry heavy losses to the budget and makes it
19  Since 1993, Zambia has used a cash budget system, under which expenditures are authorized only when
revenues are received by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED).-23-
much harder for a country to achieve fiscal sustainability, at least in the short term, so that
policies for internal and external balance need to be  closely coordinated.
Fiscal Solvency and Sustainability in India
58.  India is also facing serious fiscal imbalances. The fiscal problems of India have been
discussed in detail in various reports 20 and are analyzed here using the model presented
above 2l.  There is no estimate of quasi-fiscal deficit available. Table 3 below presents the
results of the model for the three fiscal years 1995/1996, 1996/1997, and 1997/1998
respectively 22. The public sector encompasses the central government, state governments,
and non-financial public enterprises. Detailed data used in the analysis are provided in
Annex Table A2, summarized in Table 4 below.  In 1997/1998, for instance, solvency for the
public-sector would require a primary surplus of not less than 3.1 percent of GDP, but the
actual primary balance was a  deficit of 1.7 percent.  The gap between the desired and actual
figures, shown as fiscal solvency adjustment, rises quickly, indicating a more serious
problem than the increase in the conventional fiscal deficit would suggest.
Table 4:  India:  Public Sector Solvency and Sustainability
(percentage of GDP)
1995/96  1996/97  1997/98
Public Sector Solvency
Primary Balance  -0.9  -1.1  -1.7
Real GDP Growth  8.0  7.3  5.0
Domestic Debt  67.5  64.9  66.8
External Debt  30.9  30.3  30.5
Primary Balance for Solvency  -3.5  2.5  3.1
Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  -2.5  3.5  4.8
Public Sector Sustainability
Grants  0.1  0.1  0.1
Sustainable Primary Balance  -2.2  2.9  1.6
Actual Central Government Primary  -0.9  -1.1  -1.7
Balance
Public sector Sustainability Adjustment  -1.2  4.0  3.3
Memorandum Items
Conventional Deficit  -7.9  -7.8  -8.5
Source:  World Bank staff calculation
20 See, for example, India Country Economic Memorandum, Report Number 15882-IN, August 8, 1996,
Chapter 3.
21 The current version updated data from an earlier version of the paper, see Hinh Dinh (1995), but the
empirical results are broadly in line with those, as well as with the India CEM (1996) and with the paper by
Buiter (1994) although the last two papers used a slightly different methodology.
22 The Indian fiscal year runs from April I to March 31.-24-
59.  The analysis of India's fiscal problems illustrate the strong linkages between the
budget and financial repression. In 1997/98, under the assumption of a 10% real discount
rate, or no financial repression,  the public-sector in India would have required a primary
surplus of not less than 3.1 percent of GDP in order to be solvent and about 1.6% of GDP
primary surplus for fiscal sustainability. If the analysis were carried out using the actual
government borrowing rate in the domestic markets (about 5%), the amount of fiscal
adjustment would be smaller (Table 5).  Thus, for example, with a real discount rate of 5%,
roughly what the government is paying in the domestic market, the required solvency
adjustment in 1997/98 would fall from about 4.8% of GDP .5% (Table 5) and the no
adjustment is required for fiscal sustainability (negative value of 1.2 in Table 5).  The
difference between the first and the other columns of Table 5 reflects the implicit financial
repression in the economy. The fiscal adjustment burden for India is clearly higher when the
real discount rate is 10 percent  than when it is 5 percent.  The implication is that if, and
when, financial liberalization takes effect, the burden on fiscal adjustment automatically
increase sharply and this partly explains the reluctance of policy-makers to increase real
interest rates. Thus, measures to liberalize interest rates would need to be accompanied by
stringent fiscal polices over and above the explicit budgetary costs of such measures.
Table 5:  India:  Required Solvency and Sustainability Adjustments
Under Alternative Discount Rates, 1997198
(percent of GDP)
X  . 0000-  _ tpisDf$oiint  gte  s
Fiscal  Solvency  Adjustment  9.0  4.8  .5
Fiscal  Sustainability  Adjustment  7.8  3.3  -1.2
60.  Perhaps even more important than the quantitative fiscal adjustment is the quality of
fiscal adjustment. In recent years, India has succeeded in implementing fiscal reform aimed
at reducing personal income tax as well as excise and customs duties to spur growth and to
improve tax collection. The root cause of fiscal problems appears to lie not on the revenue
side but on the expenditure side, particularly in two areas. First,  strong political pressures
coming from general elections tend to limit the ability of  any minority government to deal
effectively with the public-enterprise sector and privatization.  Second, inter-governmental
fiscal relations hamper the extent to which public expenditure can be controlled. The current
structure allows states to finance more than 50 percent of their spending with central
government transfers and thus dilute their fiscal responsibilities. At the moment, the center
does not appear to be in a position to cut these tax transfers to the states, although it could
reduce grants and loans allocated to them. Any serious fiscal effort would need to address
these two issues.-25-
61.  Fiscal adjustments at the state and public-enterprise level will be a complex and time-
consuming process, however.  In the case of public-enterprises, further fiscal adjustment will
require increasing profitability through a combination of restructuring, commercialization,
and privatization. For the states, it will require increasing resource mobilization (mainly
through improved cost recovery) and cutting unproductive expenditures. As financing from
the central government to the states is reduced, this process will accelerate, although it is far
from obvious that it will be orderly.
62.  As the India case illustrates, there is a trade-off between fiscal and other
macroeconomic policies (Table 5). If the political economy of the adjustment program is
such that phasing out financial repression has a better chance of success than eliminating it in
one swoop, it is possible to undertake sound, albeit slow, fiscal reform and adjust the fiscal
burden  gradually. This approach entails buying time for fiscal reform to bite.  Conversely,
relaxing the monetary stance to extract an inflation tax from the public would help fiscal
sustainability only in the short run but would do nothing for the country's long-run solvency.
Fiscal Solvency and Sustainability in Argentina
63.  Since 1991, Argentina has instituted a currency board which fixes the peso exchange
rate at 1:1 to the US dollar. Thus, inflation tax, which is normally available to other
countries, does not exist. Table 6 shows the proposed fiscal analysis for Argentina. By and
large, the fiscal adjustments for the period 1995-1997 were sufficient except for 1996 when
some further fiscal tightening would have been desirable. While the table shows that the
fiscal adjustment path is adequate as far as solvency and sustainability are concerned, it also
shows that there is not much room for maneuver in case of external or internal shocks. A
small deviation from the expected revenue or expenditure path would require prompt fiscal
adjustments.
Table 6:  Argentina: Public Sector Solvency and Sustainability
(percentage of GDP)
1995  1996  1997
Public Sector Solvency
Primary Balance  1.0  -1.4  0.5
Real GDP Growth  -4.0  4.8  8.6
Domestic Debt  9.0  8.4  12.5
External Debt  31.8  32.4  37.9
Primary Balance for Solvency  -0.6  1.1  -0.3
Public Sector Solvency Adjustment  -1.6  2.5  -0.8
Public Sector Sustainability
Sustainable Primary Balance  -1.5  1.2  -0.4
Actual Primary Balance  1.0  -1.4  0.5
Public Sector Sustainability Adjustment  -2.5  2.6  -0.8-26-
Memorandum Items 
Conventional Deficit  -.5  -2.9  -1.3
Source:  Author's calculation
64.  In the context of Argentina, since the nominal exchange rate is fixed by the currency
board, this implies that it is important to focus on structural policies to improve productivity
and/or to improve domestic resource cost.  The analysis also indicates that under the
envisaged policy framework, the adjustment paths are very tight and there is little room for
coping with external or domestic shocks. Thus there is a need to maintain a substantial level
of contingency fund to cope with the unexpected shocks.
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
65.  This paper proposes an approach to assess country fiscal performance over time and
across countries. Data requirements are kept to a minimum, and both flow and stock
variables on internal and external debt are taken into account.  Two indicators measure fiscal
adjustment efforts: fiscal solvency adjustment which measures how far additional fiscal
efforts need to be undertaken to restore solvency to the public-sector; and fiscal sustainability
adjustment which measures how far additional fiscal efforts are required to maintain the
internal and external debt-to-output levels.
66.  The approach proposed represents a minimum effort to take into account the linkages
between fiscal, monetary, exchange -rate  policies and domestic interest rate and growth. These
linkages exist in all economies in one form or another. They have been strengthened in the
1990's partly because of the adjustment and liberalization measures taken by developing
countries and partly because of larger capital inflows into these countries. These inflows
make economic management inherently more difficult and bring home two important aspects
of fiscal policy. First, they point to the critical role of fiscal policy as an anchor for macro
stability. When fiscal issues are under control, coordination of other macro policies becomes
easier.  When fiscal issues are part of the problem, the trade-offs between policy outcomes
become pronounced, and management of capital flows becomes much more difficult.
Second, the traditional boundary between internal and external balances has become more
blurred and the number of channels through which inflation can be generated has increased.
Recent instability in the world financial markets (the East Asian crisis) shows that in a
financially integrated world, fiscal policy can play a role over and above the traditional one.
67.  The framnework  proposed in this paper could be used to identify specific fiscal
policies where actions are needed and to pinpoint the trade-offs between policies.  Thus, in
some countries, the foundation for a sustainable fiscal deficit has to be public-enterprise
reform and privatization, while for others it is spending controls at the local level. The speed
in achieving solvency and sustainability therefore depends on the political economy of
implementing these measures without causing social problems. For instance, if the root-27-
cause of the deficit is the wage bill, success depends on the design and implementation of a
definite long-term lay-off strategy, including policies for retraining of workers. Similarly, in
some countries, financial repression is high so that if (and when) the financial sector is
liberalized, pressures on the budget will build up, over and above the required measures to
attain solvency and sustainability. When combined with the solvency and sustainability
analysis of external debt, the proposed framework can also be used to predict the occurrence
of a crisis, either through fiscal policy as in Latin America in the early 1  980s, or through
accumulation of short-term external debt as in East Asia in the late 1  990s.
68.  There are several limitations to the approach proposed here. First, the framework
does not contain any behavioral relationship underlying adjustment indicators.  Thus, for
example, while the model allows estimation of the impact of a 10 percent devaluation on
expenditures, (and therefore on the budget in the short term), it ignores the impact of the
devaluation on exports, on GDP growth, and consequently on government revenues. Such
impact can only be estimated on the basis of country-specific parameters 23. In return for this
cost, the framework developed here can be applied to all countries because it only relies on
accounting identities.  Second, there is no indication of the desired or optimal time path to
achieve solvency or sustainability objectives. How long the adjustment should be carried out
is a matter of judgment that only policy-makers can make.  Third, the analysis would need to
be supplemented by other qualitative judgments, especially on country-specific fiscal issues
along the line suggested in section IV. Nevertheless, the analysis of fiscal solvency and
sustainability is useful in analyzing key fiscal issues over time and across countries,
providing valuable insights into the adequacy and pace of policy initiatives, and identifying
the trade-offs between economic policies.
23 A Computable General Equilibrium model would be more suitable for this purpose, but cross-country
comparison for policy analysis would be virtually impossible.-28-
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Annex Table Al
Table Al:  Domestic Debt and Public-Sector  External  Debt
Average 1994-1996, in percentage of GDP
Public-Sector  Public-Sector
Country  Domestic External  Debt  Country  Domestic  External  Debt
Debt  Debt
Algeria  21.0%  70.6%  Jordan  19.8%  104.0%
Argentina  6.2%  24.4%  Kenya  21.7%  69.1%
Bangladesh  9.5%  54.8%  Lebanon  52.0%  10.7%
Belarus  2.3%  28.0%  Lithuania  2.0%  6.6%
Bolivia  6.5%  74.8%  Malawi  10.4%  126.3%
Brazil  14.2%  15.4%  Malaysia  38.4%  18.3%
Bulgaria  76.4%  83.7%  Mauritius  9.6%  29.0%
Cameroon  22.5%  96.6%  Mexico  6.4%  26.9%
Chile  9.0%  15.3%  Morocco  34.4%  64.6%
China  5.7%  13.8%  Nigeria*  29.8%  47.2%
Colombia  8.5%  19.2%  Pakistan  18.5%  43.2%
Costa Rica  4.8%  34.1%  Panama  0.0%  37.9%
Cote  d Ivoire  30.1%  149.0%  Papua  New  Guinea  16.0%  31.0%
Croatia  21.0%  13.1%  Paraguay  1.0%  16.7%
Dominican  Republic  5.0%  30.3%  Peru  1.9%  38.2%
Egypt  38.5%  53.0%  Philippines  46.9%  41.8%
El Salvador  3.3%  22.1%  Poland  21.3%  34.1%
Fiji*  30.1%  8.6%  South  Africa  55.7%  16.2%
Gabon  28.3%  80.9%  Thailand  2.0%  11.2%
Ghana*  12.0%  75.7%  Trinidad  & Tobago  18.0%  33.8%
Guatemala*  0.7%  16.9%  Tunisia  18.6%  49.3%
Honduras*  24.3%  105.5%  Turkey  14.5%  31.9%
Hungary  82.5%  53.2%  Uganda  1.2%  58.8%
India  67.5%  26.9%  Uruguay  5.0%  22.7%
Indonesia  1.0%  33.0%  Venezuela  12.1%  41.6%
Jamaica  34.1%  72.1%  Zambia  5.0%  111.1%
Zimbabwe  37.6%  51.2%
Sources: World Bank and IMF Reports.
*: Fiscal data only available until 1995.-31-
Annex Table A2
Table A2: INDIA
COUNTRY and PUBLIC SECTOR SOLVENCY and SUSTAINABILITY
1995/96  1996/97  1997/98
Country Solvency
Non-Interest Current Account (NICA) ($ millions)  -1,650  -588  -365
NICA/Exports  -3.5%  -1.1%  -0.7%
Real Export Growth  31.5%  7.0%  10.1%
Difference between 10% and Real Export Growth  -21.5%  3.0%  -0.1%
Country Solvency Index  -43.1%  5.5%  -0.1%
Country Solvency Adjustment (% of Exports)  -39.6%  6.7%  0.5%
Public Sector Solvency
Primary Balance (LCU billions)  -115  -151  -266
Primary Balance/GDP  -0.9%  -1.1%  -1.7%
Real GDP Growth  8.0%  7.3%  5.0%
Difference between  10% and Real GDP Growth  2.0%  2.7%  5.0%
Public Sector Solvency Index  -3.5%  2.5%  3.1%
Public Sector Solvency Adjustment (% of GDP)  -2.5%  3.5%  4.8%
Country Sustainability
Gross Disbursements (LT+IMF+ST) ($ millions)  7,140  6,682  9,044
Gross Disbursements/Exports  15.0%  12.8%  16.3%
Interest Payments (LT+IMF+ST) ($ millions)  4,605  4,441  5,514
Interest Payments/Exports  9.7%  8.5%  9.9%
Net Disbursements (LT+IMF+ST) ($ millions)  220  37  2,493
Net Disbursements/Exports  0.5%  0.1%  4.5%
DOD/ Exports  198.8%  179.7%  169.9%
Sustainable NICA Balance(- - deficit)  -32.4%  7.8%  -11.7%
Actual NICA (- = deficit)  -3.5%  -1.1%  -0.7%
Country Sustainability Adjustment (% of Exports)  -28.9%  9.0%  -11.0%
Public Sector Sustainability
Real GDP Growth Rate  8.0%  7.3%  5.0%
Exports/GDP  15.5%  16.8%  17.9%
DOD/GDP  30.9%  30.3%  30.5%
Devaluation Rate  9.2%  1.0%  -6.4%
Grants/GDP  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%
Sustainable Primary Balance (-  deficit)  -2.2%  2.9%  1.6%
Actual Primary Balance (- = deficit)  -0.9%  -1.1%  -1.7%
Public Sector Sustainability Adjustment (% of GDP)  -1.2%  4.0%  3.3%
Conventional Fiscal Deficit  -7.9%  -7.8%  -8.5%
Memorandum Items:
Domestic Debt/GDP  67.5%  64.9%  66.8%
Domestic Revenue/GDP  22.0%  21.0%  21.5%-32-
DATA INPUT  199;'SX  E0E'j00"Xj:L*L:Z:i'k0i000|XlRECE0-  5/96  19960/7'  197
Current Account Balance (current US$ milL)  -6255  -5029  -5879
Interest Payments (current US$ mil.)  4605  4441  5514
Exports of Goods and NFS (current US$ mil.)  39657  41607  45109
Factor Receipts (current US$ mil.)  1429  1073  1561
Workers Remittances (current US$ mil.)  6404  9326  8906
Exports of Goods and Services (current US$ mil.)  47490  52006  55576
Exports (GNFS) (current LCU mil.)  1258510  1346758  1482446
Overall Balance (- Deficit) (current LC1: mil.)  -956802  -1104796  -1322874
Interest on External Debt (current LCU mil.)  52182  64818  55462
Interest on Domestic Debt (current LCU mil.)  789658  888888  1001800
Total Current Revenues (current LCU mil.)  2684936  2957051  3354666
GDP at Current Market Prices (LCU mil.)  12179630  14098490  15635520
GDP at Constant Market Prices (LCU mil.)  10222850  10964330  11510140
GDP at Current Market Prices (US$ mil.)  305504  308848  309760
Gross Disbursements (LT+IMF+ST)  (US$ mil.)  7140  6682  9044
Net Disbursements (LT+IMF+ST) (US$ mil.)  220  37  2493
Interest Payments (LT+IMF+ST) (US$ mi.)  4605  4441  5514
Debt Outstanding (LT+IMF+ST) (US$ mil.)  94387  93435  94404
Index REER X-rate Index (1990=100), IMF  176  177  166
Official Capital Grants (US$ mil.)  345  410  379
PPG debt/GDP (current $US) (Ext. Debt)  26%  25%  26%
Total Govt. Domestic Debt (General Govt.) (curr. LCU mil.)  4962925  5734965  6698931
Net Domestic Credit to Govt. (current LC(U  mil.)  2577780  2886200  3306190
Domestic Debt (current LCU mil.) (Public Finance)  8218824  9154199  10441148
Domestic Debt/GDP (current LCU mil.) (Public Finance)  67%  65%  67%
Source: World  Bank  Country  Data  and  Author's  CalculationPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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